Chat control means EU rules under which messaging services scan private messages for child sexual abuse material. Today the scanning is voluntary, but in the European Commission’s proposal it would be mandatory. Voluntary chat control is in force in Finland and across the EU until 3 April 2028, and the permanent regulation is still under negotiation. The passport register, for its part, should be abolished. Both concern everyone’s privacy. In the EU, Finland must be unambiguously against mass scanning of private messages, and passport fingerprints must be stored only on the passport chip.
Both proposals continue familiar practice. The police can open a single letter with a court’s authorisation, but not every letter is opened in advance. A passport proves identity, and in Sweden and Germany the fingerprint is held only on the passport chip. Surveillance, once built, easily becomes permanent. The EU adopted message scanning in 2021 as a temporary derogation, and it has been extended twice, first to April 2026 and now to April 2028. The line must be drawn before the structure exists.
What does chat control mean and why is it a problem?
Chat control means that a messaging service goes through its users’ private messages and looks for child sexual abuse material. The problem is that the scanning targets everyone in advance, not only those suspected of a crime. Under the confidentiality of correspondence, suspicion comes first and surveillance only after it, with a court’s authorisation.
In April 2026 I wrote about why Parliament was right to reject the continuation of chat control.
Is chat control coming to Finland?
Chat control is already in Finland on a voluntary basis. The new EU regulation allows messaging services to scan unencrypted private messages until 3 April 2028, but end-to-end encrypted messages are excluded. On the permanent regulation, which will decide the future of scanning, the Member States and the European Parliament did not reach agreement in the September 2026 negotiation.
The temporary rules lapsed on 3 April 2026 because Parliament had rejected their extension on 26 March 2026 by 311 votes to 228. The rules returned as a new regulation, and Parliament tried to reject that too on 9 July 2026. The rejection was supported by 314 Members and opposed by 276, but it would have required a majority of all Members, 360 votes. Parliament did secure an amendment leaving end-to-end encrypted messages outside scanning. Regulation (EU) 2026/1881 entered into force on 31 July 2026, so from April to the end of July there were no rules at all.
The permanent regulation will decide what kind of chat control the EU is left with. In November 2025 the Council of the EU removed the mandatory scanning orders from its position. On scanning private messages there is no agreement.
What is Finland’s position on chat control?
Finland’s position on chat control is conditional. The Government’s position, which the Grand Committee and the Administration Committee of the Finnish Parliament have endorsed, rejects mass surveillance of private messages and the weakening of strong encryption. According to the Grand Committee, voluntary detection is in principle acceptable, but the Constitution’s requirement of a concrete, individual suspicion of a crime must not be circumvented through voluntariness.
The Grand Committee (suuri valiokunta) set this out in opinion SuVL 4/2025 vp on 4 June 2025 and welcomed the removal of the mandatory orders. The Administration Committee (hallintovaliokunta) endorsed the Government’s position in opinion HaVL 26/2025 vp on 25 November 2025, after the Government had sent report UJ 31/2025 vp on the Danish Presidency’s compromise. How Finland voted when the Council formed its position in November 2025 is not public.
End-to-end encryption, in which only the sender and the recipient can read a message, must be protected as part of the confidentiality of correspondence under section 10 of the Constitution. When a suspicion is concrete, surveillance would target the suspect’s device with a court’s authorisation, not everyone’s communications in advance.
A concrete suspicion before surveillance is the minimum the rule of law requires.
Finland must hold to these conditions in the negotiations and reject mass scanning of all private messages. The permanent regulation must not allow scanning without a concrete suspicion of a crime, not even on a voluntary basis. If the final text allows it, Finland must say no.
The passport register repeats the same pattern. Data was collected for one purpose, and now the Government wants to widen its use.
May the police use passport fingerprints?
The police may not use passport fingerprints in criminal investigations. When the Finnish Parliament decided on the use of passport fingerprints in 2009, use in criminal investigations was ruled out, and the police could use the data only to identify victims of accidents, disasters and crimes. Government bill HE 121/2025 vp would open the register for investigating serious crimes, but the bill is still in the Administration Committee of Parliament.
The Administration Committee recorded in report HaVM 9/2009 vp that the register does not allow use in criminal investigations. The Government submitted the current bill on 25 September 2025, covering the fingerprints in both the passport and ID card registers.
In opinion PeVL 24/2026 vp of 16 April 2026, the Constitutional Law Committee (perustuslakivaliokunta) required three changes. An authority independent of the executive would authorise use, the list of crimes would be narrowed, and the person would be told of the use afterwards. In a second opinion, PeVL 50/2026 vp of 22 June 2026, the Committee found that the National Police Board (Poliisihallitus) cannot be the authorising authority. Even amended, the register would exist, and every later government could propose widening its use again.
Why should the passport register be abolished in Finland?
The passport register should be abolished because a fingerprint register holding the fingerprints of everyone who has applied for a passport or an ID card invites use beyond what was promised. In Sweden and Germany the fingerprint is stored only on the passport chip, and the authority destroys it at the latest when the passport has been handed over. That way the fingerprint stays within the use for which it was given.
Under section 6 a of the Swedish passport act, fingerprints are destroyed as soon as the passport is issued. The German passport act prohibits a national biometric database and requires the fingerprints to be deleted at the latest after the passport has been handed over. As early as 2018 the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) warned in its opinion on ID cards against storing biometric data in national databases too. In January 2026 I wrote with Atte Harjanne about how the register came about, in The use of passport identifiers must not be expanded.
Today a fingerprint unlocks a phone and a banking app, so it works as a password that cannot be changed. Tomi Voutilainen, Professor of Public Law at the University of Eastern Finland, described in an interview with Uusi Juttu how the secondary purposes of registers gradually become primary ones.
When the state obliges people to give their fingerprints for a passport, they may be used for that and nothing else. That is the minimum the rule of law requires.
A passport proves identity. It needs no other function.
The passport register and chat control are two cases of the same pattern. A third is the intelligence legislation, where surveillance was proposed to be extended to ordinary crime. More is in my writing on technology.
When you apply for a passport or send a message, you must be able to trust that the information is used only for what you gave it for. The state must keep its promise even when breaking it would be technically easy. I am standing for Parliament in Uusimaa because privacy needs defending, and defending privacy is defending democracy.
Frequently asked questions
What does chat control mean and why is it a problem?
Chat control means that a messaging service goes through its users' private messages and looks for child sexual abuse material. The problem is that the scanning targets everyone in advance, not only those suspected of a crime. Under the confidentiality of correspondence, suspicion comes first and surveillance only after it, with a court's authorisation.
Is chat control coming to Finland?
Chat control is already in Finland on a voluntary basis. The new EU regulation allows messaging services to scan unencrypted private messages until 3 April 2028, but end-to-end encrypted messages are excluded. On the permanent regulation, which will decide the future of scanning, the Member States and the European Parliament did not reach agreement in the September 2026 negotiation.
What is Finland's position on chat control?
Finland's position on chat control is conditional. The Government's position, which the Grand Committee and the Administration Committee of the Finnish Parliament have endorsed, rejects mass surveillance of private messages and the weakening of strong encryption. According to the Grand Committee, voluntary detection is in principle acceptable, but the Constitution's requirement of a concrete, individual suspicion of a crime must not be circumvented through voluntariness.
May the police use passport fingerprints?
The police may not use passport fingerprints in criminal investigations. When the Finnish Parliament decided on the use of passport fingerprints in 2009, use in criminal investigations was ruled out, and the police could use the data only to identify victims of accidents, disasters and crimes. Government bill HE 121/2025 vp would open the register for investigating serious crimes, but the bill is still in the Administration Committee of Parliament.
Why should the passport register be abolished in Finland?
The passport register should be abolished because a fingerprint register holding the fingerprints of everyone who has applied for a passport or an ID card invites use beyond what was promised. In Sweden and Germany the fingerprint is stored only on the passport chip, and the authority destroys it at the latest when the passport has been handed over. That way the fingerprint stays within the use for which it was given.
Other posts
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Chat control: parliament was right
The European Parliament rejected the extension of the chat control law. The police statistics are real, but parliament was still right — here is why.
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The use of biometric identifiers in passports must not be expanded
When fingerprints were added to passports, Finland created a national biometric register. Now the government wants to open it to police use.
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Fundamental rights must not be dismantled without justification
The government plans to extend intelligence methods to fight crime without individual suspicion — a serious threat to fundamental rights.